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[Crim. No. an5. In Bank. Dec. 26, 1961.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LAWRENCE 
CHRISTOPHEH. GARNER, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Extradition-Rights of Person Wroilgfully Seize d.-The power 
of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact 
that he was forcibly seized in another country or state and 
transferred to this state by violence, force or fraud for an 
olIense alleged to have been committed in this state, there 
being no provision in the Constitution, laws or treaties of the 
United States which guarantees him any protection in such 
transaction. 
[2a,2b] Criminal Law-Evidenee-Confessions.-Where a pretrial 
confession is voluntarily made, it is admissible in evidence so 
far as due process is concerned, though defendant was not 
taken before a magistrate until four days after his arrest in 
Arizona. 
[8] Id.-Right to Pretrial Inspection of Confessions.-The right of 
defendant's trial counsel in a murder ease to inspect, view, 
hear or copy any and all statements of defendant in discovery 
proceedings before trial extends to a joint confession given by 
defendant and his codefendant. (Disapproving any contrary 
inference in Schindler v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.App.2d 513 
[327 P.2d 68].) 
[4] leL-Right to Pretrial Inspection of Confessions.-The district 
attorney is not required to seek out defendant's trial counsel 
and present statements by defendant to him for inspection; 
it is the duty of such counsel to go to the district attorney's 
office and inspect the statements available to him there. 
[5] Id. - Appeal- Harmless Error - Evidence - Confessions. -
Where no objection was made in thc trial court to the intro-
duction of a tape-recorded confession on the ground that de-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Extradition, § 44-
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 421 et seq. ; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 477 et seq. 
[3] See CaLJur.2d, Trial, § 383. 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Extradition, § 13i [2] Criminal Law, 
§ 465; [3,4] Criminal Law, § 272; [5] Climinal Law, §1382(27); 
[6, 7] Criminal Law, l469; [8-10, 12-14] Criminal Law, § 467; 
[11] Criminal Law, § 820; [15] Criminal Law, § 189; [16] Wit-
nesses, § 242; [17] Criminal Law, § 1075; [18] Criminal Law, 
§ 1383; [19] Criminal Law, § 1377(1); [20] Criminal Law, 
§ 266(1); [21] Criminal Law, § 266; [22] Homicide, § 172; [23] 
Criminal Law, § 632. 
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fendnnt's counsel had not been Ilft'ordcd opportunity to hear 
the tape befon! trilll, where the record fOllows clearly that the 
tape was not U I:\urprise to defcudant's counsel, and where de-
fendant's handwritten confl'!;sion, which was also introduced in 
evidence, contained the same mlltter as was on the tape, the 
introduction of the taped confession did not result in any 
prejudicial error to defendnnt. 
[6J Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-There was no merit to a conten-
tion that various confessions of defendant in a murder case 
were obtaincd in rcturn for favors granted or withheld at the 
discretion of law enforcement officials where the record dis-
closed that each of the confessions received in evidence was 
freely and voluntnrily made, without duress, inducement or 
promise of reward. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-A. contention that an instruction 
concerning tIl(' voluntariness of a confession was faulty in that 
it failcd to cover the subject of implied coercion is of no 
avail where tIle record does not show that any implied coercion 
existed. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-A voluntary admission is not a 
necessary product of an illt'gal detention. 
[9] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-Though an earlier confession, 
admitted in evidence, might have been found involuntary by 
the jury because of delay in the arraignment, defendant was 
not prejudiced where thel'e was nothing in the record to sup-
port a finding that confessions made after the arraignmcnt, 
one in the presence of his wife, were influenced by the earlier 
delay in bringing him before a nmgistrate and appointing 
counsel to represent him. 
[10] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-A showing thnt dcfendantwas 
allowed to see his wife before finishing his handwl'itten con-
fession, and thnt it was four hours after his conference with 
his wife had ended before he completed the lengthy statement 
and gave it to the sherifl', is insufficient to show that he gave 
the statement in l'eturn for permission to see his wife. 
[U] Id.-Instructions-Confessions.-An instruction that the fact 
that defendant was under a.nest at the time he made a con-
fession or an admission, was not then represented by counsel, 
. was not told that any statement he might nlake could or would 
be used against him, or was told that others had made state-
ments implicating him in the crime might be considered to-
gether with other evidence bearing on the voluntariness of 
defendant's ,confession would be r('le"ant only where there is 
evidence showing these factors to be part of an overall pat-
tern of coercion or other improper influence. 
[12] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-Absence of defendant's counsel 
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~'jthout threats, force, duress or promise of reward does not 
of itself render the confession inadmissible and in violation 
of the due process clause of the federal Constitution. Each 
ease must be examined to determine if a failure to provide, 
or to permit defendant to consult, counsel violated constitu-
tional rights or otherwise impaired the voluntary character 
of an admission. 
[18] ld.-Evidence-Confessions.-Where a defendant who has 
been apprehended and charged with a crime volunteers to make 
a confession and does so outside the presence of hisattomey 
with no persistent grueling on the part of interrogating om-
cers, his cOllstih:t.iollal rigllts have not been violated. 
[14] ld.-Evidence-Confessions.-Where defendant had sent word 
to the sheriff tllnt he. wanted to see him and, on the sheriff's 
arrival, voluntarily gave what he tllen insisted was a tme 
account of the crimes in question, this confession was not the 
result of any grueling of defendant. 
[15] ld.-Arraignment-Right to Counsel.-There was no denial of 
due process based on denial of the right to counsel prior to 
commencement of judicial process where the court complied 
with Pen. Code, § 987, which provides that if defendant ap-
pears for arraignment without counsel he must be informed 
by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being 
arraigned and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel 
and the court must assign counsel if he desires and is unable 
to employ counsel. 
[16] Witnesses - Impeachment - Contradiction - Rebuttal Testi-
mony.-Where defendant in a murder case testified that he 
was in Korea "fighting for his country in March of 1951" and 
that he did not return to this country until January 1952, it 
was proper, after he had denied on cross-examination that he 
had been arrested in April 1951 in this country, to establish 
on rebuttal that he hnd been arrested on both April 4th and 
5th of that year. 
[17] Criminal Law - Appeal- Objections-Witnesses-Cross-ex-
amination.-Defendant may not for the first time on appeal 
raise objections to his cross-examination. 
(18] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Exclusion of Evidence.-As-
suming that evidence offered on behalf of defendant in a 
murder case was unproperly excluded, such error must be 
disregarded on appeal where it was not prejudicial. (Const., 
art. VI, § 4%.) 
[19] ld.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Witnesses-Cross-examina-
tion.-Any error in sustaining an objection to a question asked 
a witness on cross-examination as to whether defendant was 
permitted to make any telephone calls from the sheriff's sub-
station to his attorney or his mother after he bad boon re-
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turned to California, which objection was apparently sustained 
on the ground that the form and order of the question were 
improper, was not ground for reversal where the witness there-
after, in response to questions of defendant's counsel, testified 
that defendant did not request pennission to make a telephone 
call and that the witness was not given the name of a certain 
attorney and asked by defendant to call the attorney. 
[20] Id. - Conduct of Trial- Exclusion of Witnesses. - It was 
within the discretion of the trial judge in a murder ease to 
permit a witness to remain in the courtroom during times when 
other witnesses were testifying, notwithstanding the fact an 
exclusionary order had been made. 
[21] Id.-Conduct of Trial-Exclusion of Witnesses.-A court re-
porter can properly testify despite the fact thnt he has been in 
court contrary to an exclusionary order; likewise, where no 
prejudice was shown, permitting the presence of a sherifi'R 
stenographer whose testimony consisted of reading notes 
previously recorded by her, was within the discretion of tho 
trial judge. 
[22] Homicide - Instructions. - The jury was not improperly in-
structed in a murder ease where the record and the instruc-
tions given indicated that the jury was fully and fairly in-
structed on all material issues presented to it and that no 
prejudicial error was committed by the trial judge in in-
structing the jury. 
[23] Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Penalty Phase of Case. 
-Though the district attorney in his argulllent to the jury 
during the penalty hearing of a murder case discussed the 
deterrent effect of the death penalty, such discussion was not 
prejudicial, it being only a minor part of his argument. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Bernardino County. Archie D. Mitchell, Judge. .Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
Gregory S. Stout, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, Assist-
ant Attorney General, and Jack E. Goertzen, Deputy At-
torney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent . 
• 
McCOMB, J.-This is an automatic appeal from a judgment 
of guilty of murder in the first degree on two counts after trial 
before a jury. The jury fixed the punishment at death. 
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Viewed in the light most fa,'orable to the People, the record 
diseloses the following facts: 
On September 4, 1959, defendant, who subsequently on Sep-
tember 15, 1959, married his codefendant, Sandra Garner, 
attended a drunken party at Clifford Red's apartment in 
Inglewood, California. Included among the guests were Rich-
ard (Rick) Nowlen and Patricia (Pat) Hurley, with whom 
Clifford Red, Sandra, and defendant had participated in a 
robbery earlier that evening. 
Defendant stayed with Rick and Pat at a motel after the 
party .. He went back to Clifford Red's apartment about 11 :30 
a. m. on September 5, 1959, but then left for a while, returning 
about 5 p. m. 
Pat and Rick then arrived at Clifford Red's apartment, and 
an argument dc"eloped over the division of the proceeds of 
the robbery. 
Defendant and Sandra left the apartment about 6 p. m. and 
returned about 8 :30 p. m. Defendant had taken Rick and 
Pat's .45 and .32 caliber weapons with him. He replaced the 
weapons when he and Sandra returned to the apartment. 
Since the middle of August, Pat and Rick had been hiding 
out from the police. During most of the time they had stayed 
with Clifford Red and Sandra, but for a few days they stayed 
at the home of defendant's girl friend in San Bernardino. In 
each instance they had promised to pay a large sum of money 
for room and board, but had failed to do so. 
Defendant had had an argument at the motel with Rick that 
morning, and Rick had threatened to involve defendant in 
some sort of an escapade or to involve his mother and his girl 
friend. Defendant then decided that there was no way out of 
his relationship with Rick except to kill him and Pat. 
That afternoon, September 5, 1959, he talked Rick into 
agreeing to accompany him to Las Vegas with Pat and Sandra. 
When they left later that evening, defendant drove the car, 
Sandra was in the front seat, and Rick and Pat were in the 
back seat. 
They drove in a desert area toward Las Vegas. En route, 
they stopped at Adelanto, in San Bernardino County. De-
fendant told Rick and Pat to go to sleep, and said he wanted 
to get acquainted with Sandra. After a while, defendant and 
Sandra got dut of the car and walked around the area. They 
later took another walk so that defendant could look over the 
highway and traffic conditions. WhE.'ll they returlled to the 
ear, defendant remC'mu(,l'ed thE.'J'c were bottles in the back seat 
) 
) 
140 PEOPLE v. GARNER 
on the floorboard and decided on a plan to get possession of 
Rick and Pat's pistols. 
After defendant coaxru him awhil(', Riek gave 11im a pistol 
fully loaded. Defendant then set up the bottles and com-
menced firing the weapon. He missed purposely, because he 
knew Rick was watching and would get out of the car to show 
him how to shoot. After emptyiIlg the pistol, defendant went 
back to the car and got another clip, and Rick followed him 
with the .32 caliber weapon in his possession. 
Defendant continued firing the .45 caliber, and Rick fired 
the .32. Both men reloaded, and defendant fired two shots, 
breaking one bottle and nicking another. Defendant set up 
more bottles, and Rick was standing behind him. After placing 
the bottles, defendant walked toward Rick, brought up the 
weapon, and fired, shooting him in the stomach. Rick fell over 
backwards and dropped the weapon he had been holding. 
Defendant told Rick he was sorry but there was no other way. 
Rick pleaded with defendant, but defendant shot him through 
the top of the head. 
Defendant then awakened Pat and told her there had been 
an accident and Rick had been hurt. When she ran over to 
Rick, defendant followed her and shot her in the back of the 
head. 
A few days later defendant and Sandra fled to Mexico. The 
day after they reached Mexico the automobile in which they 
were driving was wrecked in an accident. Defendant reported 
the matter to the federal authorities and was subsequently 
called in for questioning. Later two officers from the San Ber-
nardino Sheriff's Office, Inspector Oxnevad and Lieutena lit 
Mathewson, flew to Mexico in an investigation of the murders. 
After these officers contacted the Obregon Police Department 
in Mexico, agents of the departmellt arrested defendant, osten-
sibly for investigation regarding his identification documents 
and the automobile accident in "'hirh he had been involved. 
During defendant's detention ill Mexico, Inspector Oxnevad 
advised him that he was going to ask the Mexican authorities 
to hold him pending extradition and that he would call his 
office and ask for issuance of a warrant of arrest, at which 
time defendant stated, "Well, I will go back with you freely 
and voluntarily, I don't want to lay around in any Mexican 
jails. " 
The • next day defendant and Sandra were escorted by the 
Mexican immigration officers across the border into Arizona. 
Inspector Oxnevad and' Lieutenant Mathewson, who had pre-
) 
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"jouRly been informed thnt defendant and Sandra were going 
10 he put out of Mexico, were waiting for them there. They 
then placed the two under arrest and took them to a courthouse 
in Arizona. From there tlley were returned to California. 
[1] Defendant contends: First: That the trial court was 
without the power to try Jti'1ll for the alleged murders beCa1tSe 
of the method 1lscd by the arresting officers in bringing him to 
California. 
This contention is devoid of ID!'rit. It is immaterial whether 
there was a compliance with the Mexican extradition laws or 
Arizona laws on arrest and extradition. California follows 
the federal rule relative to the trial of a defendant who has 
been obtained from outside the jurisdiction of this state. The 
rule is that it is immaterial whether a defendant has been 
forcibly seized in another country or state and transferred to 
this state by violenc!', force, or fraud for trial for an offense 
ull!'ged to have been committed in this state, there being no 
provision in the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United 
States which guarantees him any protection in such trans-
action. UtCI' v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 443 et seq. [7 8.Ct. 
225, 30 L.Ed. 421] ; Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U. S. 519, 522 [72 
8. Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541] ; In re Jones, 54 Cal.App. 423, 426 
[201 P. 944]; 35 C.J.S. (1960) Extradition, § 47, p. 477 
ct seq.) 
In Frisbie v. Collins, supra, the Supreme Court of the United 
States said, at page 522: "This Court has never departed from 
the rule anllounced in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 444 [7 
S.Ot. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421], that the power of a court to try a 
perSOll for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been 
brollght within the court's jurisuiction by reason of a 'forcible 
nb(luetioll.' No persuasive reasons are now presented to justify 
oYerrllling this lin!' of cases. They rest on the sound basis 
that due process of law is satisfled when one present in court 
is convicted of crime aft!'r haying bel.'n fairly apprized of the 
charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with 
constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in th~ 
Constitution that requil't's a court to permit a guilty person 
rightfully cOllvicl<>d to escape justi('e because he was brought 
to trial against his will." 
[2a] Second: That he was not promptly arraigned and 
that dl1ri1l0 thc intcI'val he madc certain confessions which 
Sh011.ld not have "been received in et'idc11cc. 
This cont('ntioll is devoid of merit. Defendant was arrested 
on Friday, Septcmber 18, 1959, ill Arizona. He was arraigned 
) 
142 PEoPLE tI. GARNlIlR [57 C.2d 
in municipal court on Tuesday, September 22, 1959. There-
after, on October 6, 1959, an indictment was returned against 
him, and he ""as arraigned thereunder on October 9, 1959, 
with court-appointed counsel representing him. 
It is settled in this state that where, as in the instant case, 
a pretrial confession is voluntarily made,· it is admissible in 
evidence so far as due process is concerned. (Rogers v. Supe-
rior Court, 46 Ca1.2d 8, 9 [9] et seq. [291 P.2d 929].) In 
Rogers v. Superior Court, supra, the defendant had not been 
taken before a magistrate until eight days after his arrest, well 
beyond the 48-hour statutory maximum; but his voluntarily 
made pretrial confession was nevertheless held properly re-
ceived. 
The record here discloses that each confession given by 
defendant was freely and voluntarily given, without threats 
or promises by law enforcement officers. Therefore, they were 
properly received in evidence by the trial court. 
Third: That there was a failure upon the part of the prose-
cutwn to comply with certain of the pretrial discovery orders. 
This contention is also devoid of merit. Defendant argues 
that a handwritten confession given by him on October 5, 
1959, and a tape-recorded joint confession given by him and 
his codefendant, Sandra, on October 6, 1959, "burst upon de-
fense counsel as a complete and utter surprise."1 
[8] Defendant's trial counsel was entitled to inspect, 
view, hear, or copy any and all statements of defendant, and 
such was the order of the trial judge in discovery proceedings 
had before the trial. 
This right extended to the joint confession given by defend-
ant and his codefendant. (Ca.sk v. Superwr Court, 53 Cal.2d 
72,75 [1] et seq. [346 P.2d 407] j cf. Vance v. Superi<Jr Court, 
51 Cal.2d 92, 93 [1] [330 P.2d 773].) Any inference to the 
contrary in Schin.dler v. Superi<Jr Court, 161 Cal.App.2d 513 
[327 P.2d 68], is disapproved. 
[4] The district attorney, however, was not required to 
seek out defendant's trial counsel and present the statements 
to him for inspection. Rather, it was the duty of defendant's 
trial counsel to go to the office of the district attorney and 
inspect the statements available to him there. 
The record shows that defendant's trial counsel did not 
perform t~ duty with respect to the handwritten confession. 
It shows the following statement by Mr. Turner, the assistant 
1Defendant is represented on this appeal by different counsel from that 
ill the trial court. 
) 
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district attorney: "Mr. Bailin [defendant's trial counsel] 
came to my office on perhaps two or three occasions, very 
briefly, in connection with this case. Mr. Bailin asked me at 
one time to furnish him with copies of the documents which 
were not also on tape. I advised Mr. Bailin that my office 
did not have the facilities for copying these very lengthy 
documents, and made to him the same offer that I had made to 
Mr. Hartley [counsel for Sandra Garner], that Mr. Bailin 
would bring his Stenorette machine and tape, and I understood 
that he also used the Stenorette dictation machine; that I 
would furnish him a room and lend him my Stenorette dicta-
tion machine, and he could copy all of the statements which 
we have. 
"This was never done. Mr. Bailin requested that because of 
his lack of time that he had been furnished with copies of 
those matters which were on tape, that he was asked to furnish 
the tapes, the large tapes to be used by the Sheriff's office for 
making copies, and I believe he did, and I understood, and I 
allege on that basis that because the tapes which he furnished 
were not in the best condition, the Sheriff's office made copies 
of some of the statements relating to his client on Sheriff's 
office tapes which they furnished to him. I do not know, of 
my own knowledge, exactly what Mr. Bailin did get copies of, 
since I was not present at any of the occasions on which he 
received copies. I do know of my own knowledge that he at 
no time came to my office and copied anything out of my ine. 
" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
" ... At no time has lIr. Bailin asked me whether he had 
copied all of the statements; at no time has he advised me 
what statements he did, in fact, have, and at no time has 
he asked me whether there were other statements which he 
had not seen. Our office has been ready at any and all times 
suiting his convenience to permit him to copy any statements 
made by his client." 
Defendant refers to the fact that at one time Sandra's 
counsel asked the district attorney's office for a list of state-
ments, by dates, made by both defendant and Sandra, and 
that the list given him contained no reference to any material 
of October 5 or October 6, 1959. Actually, the list did refer 
to the tape of October 6, 1959. It is evident, however, that 
any omisSion ontlle list could not have prejudiced defendant, 
since his attorney 11 ad not asked for the list. 
[5] No objection was made in the trial court to the intro-
duction in e"idenee of the tape-recorded joint confession on 
) 
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the ground that defendant's counsel had not been afforded an 
opportunity to hear it before the trial, and it is clear from 
the record that there is no basis for contending that the tape 
was a surprise to defendant's trial counsel. 
In the first place, the list which the district attorney's 
office furnished counsel for Sandra contained a notation that 
a tape was made on October 6 between 3 :30 and 5 :20, and 
counsel for Sandra testified that he notified defendant's trial 
counsel of the list. 
Furthermore, over two weeks before the commencement of 
the trial, while counsel were arguing a motion for separate 
trials, the assistant district attorney, in support of his argu-
ment against separate trials, stated: •• I feel that particularly 
in view of the fact that their confessions which I still say are 
in aU major points in agreement, in addition to those they 
have made one joint confession which they both join in it and 
in which they describe what happened .... " 
In addition, it appears that defendant's trial counsel actu-
ally heard the tape before the trial. During the discussion 
which followed the objection of defendant's trial counsel to 
the introduction of the handwritten confession, the assistant 
district attorney, after relating the failure of defendant's 
trial counsel to inspect defendant's written statements, said: 
"Mr. Bailin and Mr. Hartley came to the Sheriff's Office, I 
am told, on Saturday or Sunday, when I wasn't here, but with 
my blessings, of course, and heard a tape recording which is 
yet to be offered." 
The tape-recorded joint confession was the only tape there-
after introduced in evidence, and, as stated above, when it 
was introduced no contention was made that defendant's trial 
counsel had not been given an opportunity to hear it in ad-
vance of the trial. It seems clear, therefore, that it was the 
tape which defendant's trial counsel had heard some time 
beforehand. 
It should also be noted that defendant's handwritten con-
fession contained the same matter as the joint confession, 
which defendant's trial counsel had heard, as appears from 
the following statement which he made at the time he objected 
to the introduction in evidence of the handwritten confession: 
"I do believe, however, as a result of the order of Judge Fogg 
[the discovery order] and in all fairness in connection with 
this case, that the item which has been marked 48 [defendant's 
handwritten confession] Should be suppressed; it is cumuhl-
tive in nature with the other materials that have been pr('-
/ 
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sented, and I doubt that it'> I>uppression could hurt his [the 
district attol'l1ry '8) case." 
It thus apprars that the course pursued did not result in 
any prejudicial error to <1ef(>11(1ant. 
[6] Fourth: l'hat various confessions of defendant were 
ltobtained in return for favors granted or withheld at the 
discretion of law enforcemellt officials" and that the trial 
court erroneously instructed thc jury 'WitTz respect to the stand-
ard by which the vol1mtariness of the confessions was to be 
determined. 
This contention is not well taken. The record discloses that 
each of the eonfessions received in evidence was freely and 
voluntaril~' made, without durel>s, inducement, or promise of 
reward. (People v. Orooker, 47 Ca1.2d 348, 352 [1] et seq. 
[303 P.2d 753] ; People v. Nagle, 25 Ca1.2d 216, 223 et seq. 
[153 P.2d 344] ; People v. Grace, 166 Cal.App.2d 68, 71 [2a] 
et seq. [332 P.2d 811].) 
Rogers 'L'. Richmonil, 365 U. S. 534 [81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed. 
2d 760], relied Oll by uefC'ndant, is not applicable to the 
present case. The defendant in that case was, by a ruse, -1C'0. 
to believe that his wife, who suffere(l from arthriti~, was about 
to be taken into custody, and he confessed in order to spare her 
from being transported to the scene of the questioning. 
In reversiIlg the judgment of conviction, the United States 
Supreme Court said, at page 741 r4-6) of 81 S.Ct.: "From a 
fair reading' of these expressions [the trial ('ourt's instructions 
to the jury), we' cannot but conclude that the question whrther 
Rogrrs' confessions were admissible into eyidrllCe was an-
swered b~' referf'lIce to a legal standard wllich took into 
account the cirrumstance of prohable truth or falsity. Awl 
this is not a permissible standard undrr the Due Procrss 
Clause of the Fourteellth Amcnllll1cnt. The attention of the 
trial judge shonld have bren fo(·uscd, for purpos('s of the Fed-
eral Constitution, on tl1e question ",brther tIle behavior of the 
State's law enforcement offieials Wil;; 8urh as to overb<.>ar peti-
tioner's will to resht and briJ}g' a bout confc-ssions 110t freel~' 
self-determined-a IJuestion to be answered witll complete 
disreg-ard of whether or 110t petitioner in faet spoke the truth. 
The employment ... of a standard illferted by the bdnsion 
of reference~ to probahlc r('liabilit~· rcsulted in a constitu-
tionally inyalid cOllyiction, pursnant to which Rogers is now 
detained 'in violation of the Constitution.' " 
The instructions in thr prl'srllt Nlsr, on the other hand, 
contain no suggestion that the probable reliability of the 
) 
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confessions was a factor to be considered in determining their 
voluntariness. 
Defendant contends that the delay in his arraignment be-
yond the legally prescribed time, an alleged failure to grant 
his request to contact an attorney, and permission given him 
to see his wife allegedly with the understanding that he would 
make a statement were all factors tending to establish "im-
plied coercion." [7] He then argues that the instruction 
given setting out the factors to be considered in determining 
whether a confession is involuntary was erroneous in that it 
did not cover the subject of implied coercion as such coercion 
might be found from any or all of the facts enumerated. 
The trial court had instructed the jury as follows: "The 
law absolutely forbids you to consider a confession in deter-
mining the innocence or guilt of a defendant unless the COll-
fession was voluntarily made, and although the court has 
admitted evidence tending to show that defendant made a 
confession, you must disregard the asserted confession entirely 
unless you, yourselves, by your own weighing of all the evi-
dence, your own judging of the credibility of witnesses, and 
your own reasonable deductions, conclude that the alleged con-
fession not only was made, but was voluntary. 
"A confession or an admission is involuntary when it is 
obtained by any sort of violence or threats, or by any direct 
or implied promises of immunity or benefit, or by allY im-
proper influence which might induce in the mind of the de-
fendant the belief or hope that he would gain or benefit or 
be better off by making a statement, and when the defendant 
makes such confession or admission as the result of any such 
inducement originating with a law enforcement officcr. But, 
even though a confession or an admission is made under a hopc 
or belief of benefit, it will not be involuntary if such hope 
or benefit originated in the mind of the defendant solely, or 
was induced solely by the advice or counsel of a relative, at-
torney, or other person not connected with law enforcement." 
Even if we assume that the above instruction would be inade-
quate if there was evidence that a conft'ssion was given as a 
result of "implied coercion" not constituting the type of action 
specified by the iustruction as rendering a confession invol-
untary, this would be of no avail to defendant, as the record 
does not support his contention that any such coercion existed. 
[2b] As )iereinabove pointed out, the rule is settled in 
this state that a pretrial confession giycn during a period of 
illegal detention is admissible iii evidence, so far as due process 
) 
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is concerned, if it was ,'o]ulltarily made. (Rogers v. Superiol" 
Court, supra, 46 Ca1.2d 3, 9 [9] et seq.) [8J As was said in 
the Rogers case, at page 10, "The voluntary admission is not 
a necessary product of the illegal detention .... " [9] But 
even if the earlier confes'iion might have been found involun-
tary by the jury because of delay in the arraignmpnt, the 
record discloses that defendant was arraigllf'd before the com-
mitting magistrate on September 22, 1959, and at that time 
counsel was appointed to represent him. On October 5 and 6, 
1959, he made three confessions, one in the presence of his 
wife, and there is nothing in the record that would support a 
finding that these confessions were influenced by the earlier 
delay in bringing him before a magistrate and appointing 
counsel to represent him. 
With respect to defendant's alleged requf'st that an attorney 
be contacted for him, defendant testified that as Inspector 
OxneYad, Liclltcnant Waitc, and he were walldng upstairs 
after his interrogation on September ]8 at a substation of the 
sheriff's office at Victorville, another officer informed them 
that defendant's motlIer (to wl10m a telephone call had been 
placed at defendant '8 request) was 011 the telephone. Al-
though defendant was Dot allowed to speak with her, Inspector 
Oxnevad told him that he would give her whatf'ver informa-
tion defendant desired. According to defendant's testimony, 
he requested that she be told to have Gladys Root, of Los An-
geles, his attorney, come out there. "'~hen asked whether or 
not the message was ever communicated to his mother, defend-
ant replied, "My mother said no." 
There was DO testimony that Inspector OXllevad told de-
fendant he would not, or did not, relay t11e message, and from 
defendant's reply it may be assumed that it was not until he 
had contact wit11 his mother at a later date that he learned 
his alleged request had not been communicated to her. 
Continuing, defendant testified that he told Lieutenants 
Keene and Waite at the Victorville substation that he had the 
cards of two attorneys and asked that Mrs. Root be called, to 
whi<:h he l't'ceived the reply, "'Ve will do that later." He then 
testified: "After 'Vaite talked to me upstairs ... about five or 
10 miuutes there at the 0001', I told him, 'All right, I will 
make a' statement.'" Defeudant's willingness to confess so 
shortl~' after receivillg, as he put it, "a stall" on his request 
that Mrs. Root be called hardly shows that he was coerced into 
giving tIle confessioll as a result of the officers' alleged actions. 
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[10] With respect to defendant's contention that he was 
coerced into giving his handwritten confession by a promise 
made by thc sheriff that he could haven visit with his wife 
if he gave the statement, the sheriff denied making any su(~h 
agreement. _ 
Defendant, however, testified that on October 5 he scnt for 
the sheriff, told him that he would tell the truth and he wanted 
to see his ,vife, and reminded the sheriff that the latter haa 
promised in Victorville that he could have a visit with his 
wife. Defendant then testified: "He [the sheriff] said, 'Write 
the statement and I will let you see your wife.' I said, 'I want 
to see my wife.' I said, 'This statement, here, is started and I 
will finish it, but I want to see my wife.' He said, 'You go 
ahead back to the cell and fiuish it.' And he told the jailer 
I had that pad and pen, so he would know, and then I went 
back to the segregation unit and lay down on my bunk and 
tossed the pad on the floor along with the pen. He came back 
a couple of hours later and asked me if I was finished and I 
said, 'No, you ean take the pad back if you want, but I want 
to visit my wife.' He said, 'In the morning. You go ahead 
and write it and I will let you visit your wife.' After chow 
in the morning they got me out of my cell and took me to the 
back and I had an hour and 20 minute visit with my wife. " 
Thus, it will be seen that even under defendant's w'rsioll 
of what occurred the sheriff agreed only that defendant could 
see his wife after he finished the statement. However, defend-
ant was allo'wed to see her before finishing it, and it was four 
hours after his conference with his wife had ended before he 
completed the lengthy statement and gave it to the sheriff. 
This falls far sllOrt of proof that defendant gave the swtement 
in return for permission to see his wife. 
[11] The eourt also instructed the jury as follows: "The 
faet that a defendant was under arrest at the time he made a 
confession or an admission or that he was not at the time 
represented b~- eounsel or that he was not told that any state-
ment he might make could or would be used agaiust him or 
that he was told that others cad made statements implicatillg 
him in the cl'ime, WillllOt render such confession or admission 
involuntary.' , 
Defendant ("onteJ1us that ~ven though this instruction was 
proper in itself, the court erred hy not further instructing the 
jury that thes0 factors might be considered together with other 
evidence bearing 011 the voluntarilwss of Qefendallt's confes-
sion. Such an instruction, however, would be relevallt only 
) 
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wh{'n there is evidence showing the>ie factors to be part of an 
ovcrall pattern of coercion or other improper influencc, an(l, 
as hereinabove pointed out, the record does not support dc-
fendant's contention that any such com'eion or influence 
existed. 
[12] Fifth: That the admission into evidence of conf(!s-
sions made by dcfenda.nt after his arraignmcnt or i1HUctm(mf, 
outside the presence of /tis counscl, was a deni{]l of the ri!Jht 
to counsel a1!d a violation of the dne process clause of the 
Fourtccnth Amendment. 
There is no merit to tiJis contcntion. The absence of a 
defendant's counsel at the time he freely and voluntarily 
makes a confession, without threats, force, duress, or promise' 
of reward, do('s not of its('lf r{,lldrr the confession inadmissible 
and in violation of the due proeess clause of the federal Con-
stitution. (State of Oregon v. Kt'isticlt, 226 Ore. 240 [3j!) 
P.2d 1]06, 1110 ct SCf].] ; d. RogtT's Y. Supcri01' Co'urt, 46 Ca1. 
2d 3, 10 [11] et sef]. [291 P.2d 929].) 
Vve concur with the statement of Mr. Justice Sloan in Stale 
of O"c!Jon v. 1{"isiich, S11P1"O, at page 1110 [359 P.2d] : "Wt' 
think eaeh case must be examined to determine if a failure' 
to provide or to permit an accused to consult counsel in exist-
ence would have violateil constitutional rights or otherwise 
impaired the voluntary character of an admission. Therefore, 
we must consider the facts in this case." 
The record discloses that Oll Octoher 5, 1959, the r-:lle}"iff 
reccived a 110te from his jailer that defendant wished to l';p('ak 
with him. Pursuant to this rerlnest, the sheriff visited dcfrno-
ant at the jail, at whieh time l1e!'elldant stateil that he ,'.'on]d 
tell 11im the truth regarding the killings. Afte'l' making a 
confession orall~', dC'fcndant agTcrrl to write it in his OWI~ 
handwriting. Defenilullt hcg3n writing, Imt thrll ref]u('stcll 
permission to go to his cell and take his time to complete it. 
Latcr tllat eYclling the sheriff vi~ited defendant in his cell 
and asked him if he had finisheu bis confession. Def{'ndl1ut 
replied that hr was tirc(l and that he would finish it in the 
morning. 
The next day at 7 :30 a. m. thc sheriff asl,ed def('ndant, in 
effect, if 11(' llad fini:,hed the writtrll confession. Defemlmlt 
replird tllnt he llad 110t. Tile shl'l'iff then told him he ,,"oul(l 
pick it up lnt('r. 
At 7 :4G a. 111. Sandra was bronght to a room in the jail, 
and defcl1dant wa:~ prfmitt.ed to talk with her there for an 
hour and twenty minutes. 
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At 12 noon the granu jury returned the indictment under 
which defendant was tried.2 
About 1 p. m. the sheriff again asked defendant if he had 
finished the statement. Defendant replied that he had about 
one page more to write, and he then completed it in the pres-
ence of the sheriff. At the sheriff's request, he read the 
statement aloud and then handed it to the sheri1f. Defendant 
had dated the statement October 5, 1959. 
The sheriff asked defendant if lIe would be willing to make 
flle same statement in the presence of Sandra, and defendant 
said that he would. 
Later that afternoon Sandra was brought to the llomicide 
office, where the sheri1f read parts of defendant's statement 
to her. He asked her if it was the truth and told her defend-
and had given him the statement. To this Sandra replied that 
she would have to hear defendant say it. 
Defendant was then brought to the homicide office. The 
sh£'ri1f again read part of his statement to Sandra and asked 
defendant if he had not written it. Defendant replied in the 
affirmative and, turning to Sandra, said, "We might as well 
tell the truth." 
At 3 :30 p. m., within five or ten minutes of the time defend-
ant had entered the room, the making of a tape recording wa.c; 
begun. 
The tape shows fllat Lieutenant Keene first made a few 
preliminary remarks to record who was pr£'sent and then 
stated: "We have brought both of you down here to the 
Homicide Division, and we understand that you arc willing to 
t('11 us exactly what occurred on Satul'day niglJt, Septemb:=-r 
the 5th, and early Sunday morning, S<'ptembcr th~ 6th, at the 
time that Richard L. Nowlen, known as Rick Nowlen, and 
Patl'icia Hurley Skene, known as Pat, how they met their 
death, and who is respollsiblf'. Are you willing, the two of you, 
to relate the facts to us, as to exactly what occurred on that 
Saturday evening and early Sunday morning'" 
Both defendant and Sandra answered in the affirmative and 
acknowledged that the statements they were about to make 
\\'('re free and voluntary and were being made without an~' 
})romises of reward or immunity of any kind. They them ga,-e 
their accoUl\ts of the crimes, with som(' iuterl'ogation by Li(,ll-
ten8nt Keene from time to time l'(':raT~iug details. 
In support of llis conh>IIHon tlwt llis constitntional rigl)t~ 
"It will he recalled thnt <1"rl'udunt llll\l !IreD nrrnigncd 011 Sl'lltcmlJcr 
22, 1959, under the informnl ion originally lik<1 ng~illst him. 
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were violated by the taking of the confessions outside the 
'presence of his attorney, defendant relies on two recent New 
York cases, People v. Di Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544 [166 N.E.2d 825], 
decided by the Court of Appeals of New York, and People v. 
Waterman, 12 App.Div.2d 84 [208 N.Y.S.2d 596], decided 
by the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, and 
directs our attention to the concurring opinions in Spano v. 
New York, 360 U. S. 315, 324 et seq. [79 S.Ot. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 
1265]. 
[13] Those cases, however, are distinguishable from the 
instant case, and none of them stands for the proposition that 
where, as here, a defendant who has been apprehended and 
charged with a crime volunteers to make a confession, and he 
does so, outside the presence of his nttorney, with no persistent 
grueling on the part of interrogating officers, his constitutional 
rights have been violated. 
In Spano v. New York, supra, the defendant, after indict-
ment for first-degree murder, retained counsel and surrendered 
through the instrumentality of his attorney, who advised him 
not to make any statements. He was subjected to persistent 
and continuous all-night questioning for almost eight hours 
by an assistant prosecutor and numerous police officers, in-
cluding a personal friend who was a fledgling policeman and 
importuned him to confess. He finally did confess, after having 
repeatedly requested, and been denied, an opportunity to con-
sult his attorney. 
It was held that on tIle record in that case the defendant's 
will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue, and sympathy 
falsely aroused and that therefore the confession was not 
freely and voluntarily made and its admission into evidence 
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The majority specifically declined to rule on the defendant's 
contention that following indictment no confession obtained 
in the absence of counsel can be used without violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The concurring opinions discuss the latter question. It is 
clear, however, that what is there condemned is the obtaining 
of a confession as a result of the persistent grueling of a 
defendant iv secret after he has asked for his. attorney and 
his request has been denied. 
The confession in the Spano case was given after hours of 
persistent grueling by law en'forcemcnt officials, during which 
the defendant had steadfastly refused to answer, and unques-
tionably resulted from the grueling. In th~ present case, OD 
J 
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the otlH~r hand, the confessions were not mnde as a result of 
allY grueling of d<>fendant. 
[14] As ])(~rrtofore pointed ont, defendant had sent won1 
to tIle sheriff that llC wanted to sec him, and upon the sheriff's 
arrival voluntarily gaye what he t11en insisted was n true 
account of the crimes. Clearly this confession was not the 
result of any grurling of defendant. 
The same thing is true of defendant's lHmdwrittt'll eonf(·s-
sion. Writtcll for tIle most part while he was alone in IllS 
cell, it im-olved no interrog-atioll of an~' ]18ture. 
There was son1(' interrogation of defelldnl1t and Sandra at 
the time they maile their joint oral stah'ment later that nft.<'r-
noon; but ill the Y(~ry hq;illl1illg' of tIle interview tlH.'y haf1 
indicated their willingnc:·;s to t<:>l1 exaC'tly ,,-hat Illtrl occurred 
with respect to the killing~, ana hy 110 stretrh of the imagina-
tion can it be said tlmt sl1(·h iJltrl'l'ogatioY; eonstituted grueling 
which resulted in d<:>frlldal1t's confessing his guilt. 
Futhermore, at 110 time did drfelldant rcqurst an oppor-
tunity to consult his attorl'ry, as the defrndant in the Spano 
ease had. 
In People v. Di Biasi, supra, as in the Spano case, the dr-
fendant, after indictment for nmrdt'r, had retained cOUllse) 
and had voluntarily surrendered through the instrull1cntalit~· 
of his attorney. Subsequently he wa" qu"stioned by several 
policr offieers and an assistant district attorney ill the absence 
of l1is own attorney and made rertain dam:1gil1g' admissions. 
It is clear that the defrndant had not reqursted the interview 
or exprrs:oed any desire to mal,e a statement. 
In the present case def('ndant (lid not voluntarily surrender 
but was apprehended, and he JUld expre~sed a desire for an 
interview and an opportunity to make a stntement. 
In People v. 'Watcrman, s1rpro, the defendant had been ap-
prehended, but, unlike the present case, he had not solicited 
the present'e of the law enforeemcllt offil'iaJ to whom he made 
his confession or expres:::ecl any drsire to mal;:(' a statement. 
Shortl~- after halH1ing dowll it" dr(·ision in People 1'. Di 
Biasi, SlIP1'a, the Court of Appeals of Nmy York de('idrd the 
case of PwpZe v. Do II' l1S, 8 N.Y.2(1 860 [168 N.E.2d 710]. III 
that (·ase t}]e defClH:ant Jwd not sWTc:l·.lf'rrcl. a~ t]1(' df'frlHlnllt 
in thr Di Binsi case had, bnt had hf'('n Hpprch(,lHled after l1is 
indi(·tlllrllt. He then gayp sta tt'll1""j s 10 the l1l'1'C'!':ting offieel', 
two deteetiyes who 1180 gOlie to Flol'i,1a to take him into eus-
tod~·. and the pros,>cntor. AlthoufYh r.ll tlw"r statements wrre 
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This makes it clear that the Court of Appeals had not held in 
People v. Di Biasi, supra, as contended by defendant, that a 
clefendant has an absolute right to representation by counsel 
<luring questioning after indictment. 
The views we have expressed herein are in accordance with 
logic and common sense. If we adopted the rule contended 
for by defendant, a guilty man could employ counsel, sur-
Tt'nder himself, and then freely and voluntarily, outside the 
presence of his counsel, without threats, force, duress, or 
))romise of reward, make a full and complete confession of 
having committed a felony, and if he were the only one who 
knew the facts, it would be impossible to convict him of the 
crime he had committed. 
[16] Sixth: That denial· of the right to counsel prior to 
the commencement of judicial process is a denial of due 
process. 
This contention is tlevoid of merit. Section 987 of the Penal 
Code reads: "If the defendant appears for arraignment with-
out counsel, he must be informed by the court that it is his 
right to have counsel before being arraigned, and must be 
asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and is 
unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel to 
defend him." In the present case the trial court complied 
with the foregoing provisions of the Penal Code. 
[16] Seventh: That prool of collateral crimes tinder the 
guise of impeachment may constitute a miscarriage of justice. 
The foregoing contention is unsound. Defendant testified 
that he was in Korea "fighting for his country in March of 
1951." It was defendant's testimony that he had gone to 
Korea in February 1951 and been wounded in action in Korea, 
and that he did not return to the States until January 21, 
1952. On cross-examination defendant was asked if it were 
not a fact that in April 1951 he had been arrested by the 
Inglewood Police Department. Defendant denied the arrest. 
The prosecution established on rebuttal that defendant was 
arrested both on April 4, 1951, in Inglewood and on April 5, 
1951, in Compton. 
Apparently the sole purpose of defendant's testimony con-
cerning his "fighting for his country" was to create a sym-
pathetic background and understanding between himself and 
the jury. 'It appears from the transcript that defendant's trial 
counsel was attempting to utilize defendant's pxtensive mili-
tary background in this manner. Under these circumstances it 
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totally incompatible with the picture defendant's counsel was 
attempthlg to draw. Instead of being in Korea as a wounded 
veteran, defendant was being booked in two jails in the United 
States as a suspected criminal. 
[ 17] It would seem that defendant's counsel was satis-
fied that he had invited such a line of cross-examination, for 
he did not object at the trial to the prosecutor's questions. 
Defendant may therefore not now for the first time, on appeal, 
raise objections to his cross-examination. (People v. Lindscy, 
90 Cal.App.2d 558, 567 [16] [203 P.2d 572]; cf. People v. 
Westek, 31 Ca1.2d 469,476 [5) et seq. [190 P.2d 9).) 
[ 18 ] Eighth: That t7w·c wcrc five instanccs of the ex-
clusion of material evidMlcc on beha.lf of defendant. 
An examination of the record discloses that this contention 
is without merit. Even assuming that the evidence was im-
properly excluded, it was not prejudicial error, and under 
article VI, section 4112, of thc Constitution any such error 
would have to be disregarded by this court. 
[19] Ninth: That the trial court erred in s1tstaining an 
objection to a qucstion asked Lieutenant Barton KCC11C on 
cross-exa,mination as to whether defendant was permitted to 
make any telephone caUs from the shC1·ifJ's substation at Vic-
torville to his attot"lICY or his mother after he had bcen returnccZ 
to Cal,ifornia. 
This contention is also untenable. The court sustained an 
objection to such a question, apparently on the ground that 
the form and order of the question were improper. However, 
the record shows that thereafter Lieutenant Keene, in re-
sponse to questions of defendant's counsel, testified that de-
fendant did 110t requc:st permission to make a telephone call 
and that he (Lt. Keene) was not given a card of an attorney 
by the name of Gladys Root and asked by defendant to can her. 
It is clear that defendant's counsel was able to develop 
whether or not Lieutenant Keene had knowledge of defend-
ant's requests or attempts to make any telephone calls. 
[20] Tenth: That an 111latdllOrized person, Mrs. Betty 
Crouch, was permitted in the courtroom during the trial, in 
t,iolation of an exclusionary order. 
This contention is not correct. Mrs. Crouch was called to 
the witlle~s stand to testify as to statements she had taken in 
her capal'ity as a stenographer in the San Bernardino Sheriff's 
office, parti('ularl~- witl} refl'l"t'llce to statements taken from 
Sandra on Monda~', Spptember 21, 1959. She was asked to 
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recall Hlc (IUe~t.ions from memory. At this time Lieutenant 
J~eene wn:~ r('enll('(l f~l' 11. few qu('slions before Mrs. Crouch 
commenced to rena he1' t;tatement. 
Mrs. Crouell was then recalled to tIle stand, and counsel for 
Sandra asked the witness questions on voir dire concerning 
the statementil she Jlad tnken from Sandra. 
Lieutenant Keel1e was again recalled for vo·i,· di"e examina-
tion concerning the taking of statements from lJoth defendant 
and Sandra at the re-enactment of the crime at Adelanto on the 
morning of Septemhcr 2], 1959. 
Lieutenant Keene began testifying at this point, and prose-
cutor Turncr asked if Mrs. Crouch eould remain in the room. 
Counsel for Sandra stated, "I have no objection to her re-
maining. " Defendant's counsel, who was pr('s(,llt, and the 
trial judge made no stntcments at all. 
After eounsel finished questioning Lieutenant Keene, Mrs. 
Crouch resunwd thc stnnJ und read into the record the inter-
rogation of Sandra. Mrs. Crouch was then cross-examined. 
The court then adjoumed at 2 :47 p. m. on :Monday, April 11, 
1960. 
The next day the court convened at 10 :05 a. m. Sheriff 
Frank Bland was called as a witness and proceeded to testify. 
The afternoon recess was taken, and the court reconvened in 
chambers for argument. 
Sheriff Bland was re·called to the stand and testified to 
defendant's handwritten confession. After Sheriff Bland was 
excused, the prosecution recalled Mrs. Crouch. For the first 
time, defendant's trial cOllllsel objectell to her taking the 
stand, on the ground that she had been a spectator during 
that morning in "iolatioll of the exclusionary order. The trial 
judge overruled the objretion. 
Mrs. Crouch took the stand and proceC'ded to testify from a 
transcript concerning the statements of d('fendant and Sandra 
during the re-enactment of thc crime on September 21, 1959. 
After the statement was read into evidence, counsel for <1<,-
fendant asked no questions Oll cross-examination. 
Since a motion to exclude witll('sses except the one testifying 
is within the discretion of the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 2043), it wa's within thc discretion of the trial judge to 
permit Mrs. Crouch to remain in the courtroom as he did. 
(People v. PC"sliy, 167 Cal.App.2(1 134, 139 [4] [334 P.2d 
219] ; People v. Alaniz, 14.9 Cal.App.2c1 560, 566 [3] [309 P.2d 
71] ; People v. White, 100 Ca1.App.2d 836, 838 [1] [224 P.2d 
868].) 
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[21] It is likewise settled that It court reporter can 
properly testify despite the fad that he hac;; been in (~OUI·1. 
cOlltrary to all ex(·1usionary ordf'r. (rwplc v. Smitl:. 36 Cal. 
2d 444, 447 [3] [224 P.2(1 7]9].) 111 the prer-;cJlt eltSf', nr-; ill 
Peoplc v. Smith, SIIJlI'a, 1\1rs. Crou(·h's testimony com;istc(l of 
rcauing notes previously rf'eol'(l('d by her. Thercforl" thf're 
was no reason to exl'luue her froll1 the courtroom, and ue-
fendant has not llhoWll that lie was prejudiced in any way by 
this procedure. 
[22] Eleventll: That the jury 'Was not properly in-
structed. 
This contention is without merit. Defendant, without mueh 
argument or citation of authority, urges that the trial court 
erred in giving some instructiolls and 11O! gidllg othe}'s. Au 
examination of the record and the instructiolls giYen indieatcs 
that the jury was fully and fairly instructed upon all the 
material issues presented to it ani! that 110 prejudicial error 
was committed by the trial judgc in instructing the jury. 
[23] Twelftll: Thai the dist1'ict attorney C01ilmiticd prc-
judicial error in his argument to thc jury 011 thr liclInl/y 
hearillg. 
During the penalty hparilJg the distrid attorn!')' argued 
the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Defendant allcg'es 
that under the holding ill People Y. Lou(', 56 Ca1.2d 720 [16 
Cal.Rptr. 777, 17 Cal.Rptr. 481, 366 P.2t1 33, 809], a reycrsal 
should therefore be had as to th!' penalty heaying. 
There is 110 merit to this contention. We hllYe examill('{l tlIP. 
argument of the district attorney as it appears in tlle r(>('o1'<1 
and have concluded that hi!; c1iseu ... ,;ioll of the deterrent effe(~t 
of the death penal(v was olll~' a minor part of his appeal to the 
jury for that penalty. 
The reference to the detelTrut effect of the death pellaH~' 
was therefore not prejudicial (People v. Lane, 56 Ca1.2d 773, 
787 [16] [16 Ca1.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57], and under artit'le 
VI, section 4112, of the Constitution must be disregarded. 
The judgment is affirmeu. 
Schauer, J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., concurred. 
Gibson, O. J., concurred in the judgment. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur,in the judgment, but wish to set 
forth my reasons for concluding t.hat defendant was 110t de-
prived of the right to counsel. 
) 
Dec. 1961] PEOPLE tJ. GAR::"lJm 
(57 C.2d 135; 18 Ca1.Rptr. 40. 367 P.2d 880) 
157 
Defendant was arrested in Arizona 011 September 18, 1959. 
On that day, shortly after an alleged failure by the police to 
"om ply with his request for counsel, he made two statements 
ill response to questioning. 'rhe first included damaging ad-
missions and tIlC second a cOllfession. He made another con-
fession on the following day, and the questions put to him and 
11is uns,vers were recorded by a court reporter. On September 
21 defendant reenacted the crime for the police. On September 
22 he was arraigned, and counsel was appointed for him. He 
voluntarily brgan a fourth confession on October 5, but did 
not complete and sign it until approximately 1 p. m. 011 
October 6. Later that afternoon he and his wife made a joint 
confession. The grand jury had returned an indictment 
against him on October 6, shortly before he had completed 
the fourth confcssion. He contends that the last two con-
fessions were inadmissible on the ground that since they were 
taken in the absencc of counsel he was deprived of the right 
to counsel. 
Defendant inyo};:es the recent decisions of the New York 
Court of Appeals in People v. Di Basi, 7 N.Y.2d 544 [166 
N.E.2d 825], and Pe01Jle v. Watwman, 9 N.Y.2d 561 (175 
N.E.2d 445), which require the exclusion of admittedly vol-
untary post-indictment confessions on the sole ground that 
defendant's counsel was not present whrn defendant made his 
statements. (But see State of Oregon v. Kristich, 226 Ore. 
240 [359 P.2d 1106, 1111], in which the Oregon Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the Di Biasi rule.) The New York 
Court of Appeals relied on the concurring opinions of four 
Justices of the Ullitrd States Supreme Court in Span.o v. New 
York, 360 U.S. 315, 324, 326 [79 S.Ct. 1202, 3 L.Ed.2d 1265). 
Those opinions indicate that at least uuder some circumstances 
due process requires thc exclusion of a post-indictment con-
fession made when the defendant's counsel is not present. 
In an opinion by the Chief Justice the court reversed the con-
viction on another ground and expressly refused to decide the 
right to counsel issue. The Chief Justice, however, together 
with three of the concurring Justices ill the Spano case, had 
joined in earlier dissenting opinions to state that a defendant 
has a right to counsel immediately after arrest and that 
denial of his reqnest for a ,lawyer should result in exclusion 
of his confession. (Clv07ocr v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 
[78 S.Ct. 1287,2 hEt1.2tl 1448) ; Ciccllcia v. La.gay, 357 U.S. 
504, 511 {78 S.Ct. ] :!!17, 2 L.E<1.2d 1523],) 
) 
) 
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The Spano, Di Biasi and Watcrman cases lUust be considered 
in some detail, since they present some of tllC practical con-
siderations relevant to the solution of the constitutional prob-
lem. 
Defendant Spano was indicted for first degree murder. 
Altllough he had not then been taken into custody, he sur-
rendered three days later in the company of llis attorney, 
who cautioned him not to answer any questions. He under-
went substautial interrogation and was dellied his request to 
speak to his attorney. Thereafter he confessed. The United 
States Supreme Court reversed the jUdgment on the ground 
that the confession was involuntary, viewing ab3ence of counsel 
as one of various factors relevant to voluntarint'ss. In a con-
curring opinion Justice Douglas, jo~ned hy Jm:tices Black and 
Brennan, stated that in a capital case, 'where the accused was 
formally charged and was questioned without eompliance with 
his request for counsel's presence, his constitutional rights 
were violated as seriously as in Chancllel' Y. Frefa[J, 348 U.S. 3 
[75 S.Ot. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4], in which t11e trial court had denied 
a continuance to allow defendant to obtain coul1sel. Justice 
Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, emphasized 
the distinction between "questioning a suspect in the course 
of investigating an unsolved crime" and questioning n man 
who has formally been accused by indietnwnt, stating, "the 
absence of counsel when this confession was elicited was alone 
enougl1 to render it inadmissible under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. . . . Our Constitution guarantees the assistance of 
counsel to a man on trial for his life in an orderly courtroom, 
presided over by a judge, open to the public, and protected by 
all the procedural saft'guards of the law. Surely a Const.itu-
tion wllich promises that mnch can youchsafe no less to the 
saUle Dlan under midnight inquisition in the squad room of a 
police station." 
In the capital case involving Di Biasi the deft'ndant was 
likewise not taken into custody until after the indictment. 
He llad been hiding for some six and a half ~'ears, but sur-
rendered on the advice of his attorner. There was no show-
inl!, howe~('r, that he requested the attorllt'~· 's presence before 
making his responses to interrogation. In snmmarizing the 
('oncnrrin~ opinions in Spano v. N (10 r ork nnd applying tl1em 
to tIle ca!'e, the New York Court of AppC'nls laid down the rule 
that "after indictmellt tltc right of all accllsu] to fl,c a,~sistallcc 
of an attorncy is a,bsoluic and tllnt I!UC'stiOllill~ l1im after in-
dictment in the absence of his at1ol'll(,~' is a violation of his 
) 
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right to counsel." (166 N.E.2d at p. 828.) (Italics added.) 
The statements made by Di Biasi were therefore inadmissible, 
and the judgment was reversed. 
This holding was extended in People v. Waterman to a non-
capital case in which the accused had no counsel. The defend-
ant was apprchcnded immediately after the crime and made 
two voluntary statemcnt.c; during interrogation after indict-
ment. They were excluded because "lVaterman was without 
c01l11sel at the time of the alleged confession. He was not 
asked . . . if he had retained 01' been assigned counsel. The 
fact that defendant Waterman was without counsel at the 
time of the questioning, when he was known to the interrogator 
to be an accused, should not deprive him of the benefit of the 
principle announced in People v, Di Biasi . . , ." (208 N.Y.S. 
2d at p. 598.) (Italics added.) The decision was affirmed and 
its reasoning approved by the Court of Appeals. (9 N.Y.2d 
561 [175 N.E.2d 445].) 
In the foregoing cases, the confessions were obtained during 
police interrogation after indictment. In the present case 
there was no interrogation during or immediately preceding 
the fourth confession and relatively little interrogation during 
the making of the joint confession. Under People v. Di Biasi, 
however, exclusion does not turn on the extent of the inter-
rogation. After indictment a defendant is entitled to counsel's 
advice at any time he is talking to the authorities. The Di Biasi 
rule would therefore seem to require exclusion of Garner's 
fourth confession as well as the one made jointly with his 
wife. 
People v. Downs, 8 N.Y.2d 860 [168 N.E.2d 710], would 
not compel a different conclusion. There ",as no opinion in the 
Downs case. As the New York Court of Appeals has noted, 
however, "The Downs decision turned on the special circum-
stances there present. Thus, Downs was explicitly advised that 
he was not required to make any statements and that he could 
consult an attorney; his first confession was aetually volun-
teered before any questions were put to him; and at the trial 
he gave testimony on direct examination in his own defense, 
as forecast by his counsel in his opening to the jury, which 
was virtually identical with the statemcnts he made to the 
authorities before triaL" (People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d at 
pp. 448-449; see Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interroga.tion: 
The Right to Oounsel and to Prompt Arraignment, 27 Brook-
lyn L. Rey. 24, 55-57.) 
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The language jn the New York ('ases and in the concurring 
opinions in Spo/no v. N cu: York indicates a concern to strike 
Ii balance "between the competing interest of society in the 
protection of cherished individual rights, on the one hand, 
and in effective law enforcement and investigation of crime, 
on the other." (People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d at p. 447.) 
The balance was struck by attempting to draw a line between 
neutral inquiry by thc police aimed at discovering tIle facts 
of the crime and interrogation of a perSOll suspected of COIn-
mitting the crime. It is a formalistic assumption that indict-
ment is the point when a defcmlant particularly needs the 
advice and protection of counse1. l Often a defendant is 
arrested under highly suspicious circumstances and from the 
time he is apprehended his guilt is a foregone conclusion in 
the minds of the police. Frequently too, suspicion falls upon 
him at some intermediate point before indictment. In some 
cases the evidence against the accused may be stronger at the 
moment of arrest than it may be in other cases when the 
indictment is returned. It is hardly realistic to assume that 
a defendant is less in need of counsel an hour before indict-
ment than he is an hour after. If the neutral inquiry-suspicion 
distinction is to be read into the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it would be preferable to do so forth-
rightly as in the English Judge's Rules. (Set forth in Devlin, 
The Criminal Prosecution in England, 137.) 
The Judge's Rules provide: "1) When a police officer 
is endeayoring to discover the author of a crimc, there is no 
objection to his putting questions in respect thereof to any 
person or persons, whether suspected or not, from whom he 
thinks that useful information can be obtained. 
"2) Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to 
charge a person with a crime, he should first caution such 
person before asking any questions or any further questions, 
as the case may be. 
"3) Persons in custody should not be questioned without 
the usual caution being first administered." 
A Home Office Circular of 1930 stated: "Rule 3 was never 
illtended to authorize the qUt'stiOlling or cross-examination 
'The distinction hctwcen formal accusation and preliminary investi· 
gntion has also been used in other cont.exts to ju~tify requiring or deny· 
ing presence of counsel. (See e.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 [77 B.Ct. 
:'10, 1 L.Ed.2d 376); BOlt'les '". Bacl', 142 F.2d 78i; United States v. 
Let1ine, 127 F.Supp. 651; Bights of Witnesses in .lfdmini.sfrative Intll)s, 
tigations, 54 Harv.L.Rev. 1214; cf. Hanna11 v. J,al'c1I(', 363 U.S. 420 
11'0 S.Ct. 1;'02, ] ;;14·1,j~(1, 4 L.Ed.::d HOi J.) 
) 
) 
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of n }lrrson ill l:lls10<1y aftrr liP lJIIs !;(,(~ll l'alltillurd, 011 nil! 
snhj<·\·j of the ('1·i1llP 1'01' "llieh he is ill tl1stody .. , ," Police 
llppnrt llrc from thr nllles may in thc tliscrrtioll of the trial 
jl1!l~:(' rrsult ill t'xduding the confpssion. (Devlin, op. cit . 
. ~1I1)ra, at p. 42.) A dC',·hioll 10 exclude dr}1ell<1s 011 all the 
facts in the case. (Se<' Rcyi11a v. Ba~s [1953] 1 Q.B. 680, 684; 
Reyillo v. ,~f7'offell (1952] 2 Q.B. 911, !Jl4; Rex v. Voi.sill 
1]9]8] 1 K.B. 531, 588; Re.yifla v. Wofiam, 36 Crim. App. Rep. 
72, 7i; Rf'x \'. GI'oII-SOn, 16 Crim. App. R<,p. 7, 8.) "[W]hell-
('WI' the <,,-idel1ce in t1l(' poss<'ssioll of the police has beeomt' 
suffi('iC'utly wei~ht: .. to justify a c]large, the cllarge is for this 
purpose treated as having been made and the suspect is therc-
after treated as the aeeus<,d." (Dcvlin, op. cit. SlIpl'a at 
p. 35.) The polie{' are 11<'Jd to all ohj{'ctive standard in deler-
millilJ~ when the {'vidence has b;>eome sufficient to justify a 
chargr.2 (ld. at p. 36.) 
It is urged in support of tlj(~ Di Biasi rule that once the 
indictment is brought, the trial has in effect begun. (See 
People v. Walel'n/rlll, 175 N.E.2d at pp. 447-448.) It ",ouM 
be jU8t as reasonah]C', howe"c1', to view tlle judicial proc{'Ss as 
beginning at somt' 01 her time 8>; after arrt~st or after arraign-
ment. 
In any evcnt t]lcre arC' srrions obj<·etiollS to reading into 
t1Je Fourteenth Amen(lmellt. the nl'utral inquiry-suspicion 
(1i;;tinction. "It ma~' s{'em stl'll11ge [to the police] that they 
"llOUld he supposed 110t to ask que:4ioll!': of th<' 011e person 
who is ('<'HtraI to t11<' investigation." (Williams, QuesHoniny 
by tile Police: Some P"octicol Oonsideratiolls [1960] Crim. 
hRey. 325, 340.) Althol1:rh qtH'"tiolling mn~' sometinll's be 
nn easy substitute for ~('i(,lltific poliel' work, it is also Oft{,ll 
.. , In prllctiee. ,,'llnt happens is this. The police officer in the witness 
Lox is giyen c\'idenee of II stah'lllPllt ma,1e hy the neruRcd before enution. 
lIe COIllt'S to a part of it ",hie)1 ~oun8e1 for the defense wishes to keel) 
out if he ean; if ('OUIlSl'1 thin)(s it :lIl argun hle point, be will object Oll 
the ground that before the int'I'iminnting pnrt "'as reached, the aecuscc1 
mIght to haye be('n ('autioned, for, he ,,-ill 8ny, by this 8tnge 8urely the 
]:olice officer lIIlISt hnye mnde liP iliA Jllind t(l eh:ll'ge tIle nceused. Counsel 
~'(lr the defense iR then nlIowt'd to ero,g'exnllline 111(' police oflker to 
(oot:; blisll, if he ean, thnt there nrc good p:roun<1s for his objection, the 
of-,p('r's nnrmth'(' of e\"it1('nl'e hcillg for this purpose interrupted. If the 
(·"iul'nee whidl tll(, I·olice hnd up to tillS l'oint was ~~rong :lDd e1earh' 
l'oint('d to the accused, the offic('r will find it difficult to mnintnin under 
eross·exnminntioll thnt he IIml not yet madc up his lIIind to chnrge the 
ntC·lIsed. In ]lra"'ic~. till' jUl1ge tcnds to mnl,(' his own assessment of th(' 
('"U,'Jl('c: an<l if hI' thinks it strong cllougll, he will not put much vnlllc 
011 l1~s('rtions hy th" poli('c offi{'cr thnt. he was st.ill in doubt." (Devlin, 




162 PEOPLE t'. GAn~F.R [57 C.2<1 
('ssential to the solution of a ('rimc' and the conviction of tlle 
guilty. There may be no witnesses otller than the accused, 
or the witnesses may be dead or unavailable. Thus, as Justice 
Frankfurter stated in Culombe v. C01111ecticut, 367 U.S. 568 
[81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037] : "Despite modern advance.<; 
in the technology of crime detection, offcnses frequently occur 
about which things cannot be made to speak. And where there 
cannot be fouud innocent human witnesses to such offenses, 
nothing remains-if police investigation is not to be balked 
before it has fairly begun-but. to seck out possibly guilty 
witnesses and ask them questiom;, witncs.<;(·s, that is, who are 
suspected of knowing somethillg about the offense precisely 
because they arc suspected of implication in it. 
"The questions which these suspected witnesses are asked 
may serve to clear them. They may serve, directly or in-
directly, to lead the police to other suspects than the persons 
questioned. Or they may become tlle means by which the 
persons questioned are themselves made to furnish proofs 
whieh will eventually selld them to prison or death." (ld. at 
p. 1040 [6 L.Ed.2d ] ; Sec Wails v. 111(1ial1a, 338 U.S. 49, 57-62 
[69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801] (concurring opinion).) Al-
though at on~ time English courts excluded confessions 
obtained in violation of the Rules, tlley apparently do not do 
so now, and police qnestioning has become quite common. 
"Perhaps the truth is that the Rules have been abandoned, 
by tacit eonsent, just because they are an Ullreasonable re-
striction upon the activities of the police in bringing criminals 
to book.'· (Williams, op. cit. supra, at p. 332; see Confessions 
and Police Detention, Hearings Before the Subcommittee 
Oll Constitutiollal Rights of the Committee on the JUdiciary, 
S~llat(', 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 [Statement of Professor Harry 
Strret, University of Manchester]; ct. Cic.c1lcia v. La.gay, 
357 V.S. 504, 509 [78 S.Ct. 1297, 2 L.Ed.2d 1523].) The 
Home Secretary's circular of 1930, quoted abow, is a "dead 
letter." (Williams, op. cit. supra, at p. 330; see Barth, The 
Price of Liberty 64-65; see generally, Rcgilla Y. Bass (1953] 
1 Q.B. 680, 684; Regina Y. St1'ajJel1 [1952] 2 Q.B. 911, 914.) 
TIl£' perpetrator of a crime is normal1y the one 'rho knows 
most about it, and his eonfession, yolunta l"ily made, is often 
the -best eddence of hi~ guilt that can be obtained. (See 
Commomvea.7th v. Dillon, 4 Dull. (UJ:U 116, 117 [1 L.Ed. 
765]; Commonwealth v. Agostoll, 364 Pa. 464 [72 A.2d 575, 
:;83] ; People v. Vallcflltti. 297 N.Y. 226 [78 N.E.2d 485, 488] ; 
JIaley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 614 [68 S.Ct. 302,92 L.Ed. 224] 
) 
) 
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[dissenting opinion].) Only overwhelming social policies can 
justify the exclusion of such vital evidence. In the case of 
(~oerced confessions, the evidence may be unreliable; even if 
reliable, a free society cannot condone police methods that 
outrage the rights and dignity of a person whether they 
indude physicnl brutality or psychological coercion. (See 
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-321 [79 8. Ct. 1202, 
3 L.Ed.2d 1265] ; Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 109.) When a 
confession is voluntary, however, courts are reluctant to ex-
clude it. "Interrogation per se is not, while violence per se 
is, an outlaw." (Ashcraft v. Te71nessec, 322 U.S. 143, 160 
[64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192] [dissenting opinion]; sec 
Lyons v. Oklahoma" 322 U.S. 596, 601 [64 8.Ct. 1208, 88 L.Ed 
1481] j Lisenba v. California" 314 U.S. 219, 239-241 [62 S.Ct. 
280, 86 L.Ed. 166J.) 
As many commentators and courts have recognized, therc 
is a "compUlsion to confess" to crime. Wigmore states the 
point colorfully: "'fhe nervous pressure of guilt is enormous; 
the load of the deed done is heavy; the fear of detection fills 
the consciousness; and when detection comes, the pressure is 
relieved j and the deep sense of relief makes confession a 
satisfaction. At that moment, he will tell all, and tell it truly. 
To forbid soliciting bim, to seek to prevent this relief, is to 
:fly in the face of human nature." (Wigmore on Evidence, 
3d ed. § 851 at p. 319; see, e.g., CO'Ynmonwealth v. Agoston, 
364 Pa. 464 [72 A.2d 575,581,583].) A psychiatrist explains 
the phenomenon of confessions in terms of subconscious but 
overpowering guilt feelings and desire for punishment. "There 
is ... an impulse growing more and more intense suddenly to 
cry out his secret in the street before all people, or in milder 
cases, to confide it at least to one person, to free himself from 
the terrible burden. The work of confession is thus that emo-
tional process in which the social and psychological significance 
of the crime becomes preconscious and in which all powers 
that resist the compulsion to confess are conquered."8 (Reik, 
The Compulsion to Confess, p. 267.) 
ane continues: I' The whole emotional expenditure in confession in 
mnny eases weighs only little compared witll the work of confession, that 
painful performance in which something has to be overcome and as 
little as the punislJwent weighs compared with the suffering that origi· 
nates in the superego. No earthly judgment will attain the strictne~~ 
of the superego in many penons. Describing the work of confession in 
the expressions of ego·foetol's, it can be ('onccin'd of as the effort tllat. 
IJUcceeda in having the superego n1l0w the ego tile benefit of confession. 
'I'he masochistic pleasure of suffl'ring :md of torture through the super-
) 
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So long as the methods used comply with duc process stand-
ards, it is in the public int<.>rcst for the police to encourage 
confessions and admissions during intcrrogation.· (See 
C1tlombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 {81 S.Ct. 1860,6 L.Ed. 
2d 1037, 1040 n. 2, 1044 n. 17] ; State v.Smith, 32 N.J. 501, 
534 [161 A.2d 520] ; Commonwealth v. Agoston, 364 Pa. 464 
[72 A.2d 575, 581] ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 614 [68 S.Ct. 
302,92 L.Ed. 224] [dissenting opinion].) 
It may be argu<.>d that if the Di Biasi rule is adopted, the 
poliee will still have time to interrogate and encourage con-
fessions before an indictment is returned or an information 
filed. In some cases, however, as ill Spano v. New York and in 
People v. Di Biasi, an indictment may be returned in advance 
of the dcfendant's apprehension. In sueh cases there could 
be no interrogation of the suspect at all, except in the presencc 
of his attorney. Moreover, if tIle suspect is in custody before 
indictment, the police could easily frustrate the rule by delay-
ing the indictment or the information. TllUs, the rule would 
operate only occasiollal1y and arbitrarily. Again, it is never 
certain when the suspect will be in the proper frame of mind 
to confess. The psychological struggle between a guilty per-
son's conscious desire to protect himself and his subconscious 
guilt feelings may not be resolved in favor of confession until 
some time after the crime. (See Reik, op. cit. stlpra at p. 266.) 
Concededly, a rule that thc poliee allow counsel to be present 
during questioning of a person either after his arrest, as 
suggested in the dissellting opinion in Crooke!' v. California 
and Ciccllcia v. Lagay, s'upra, or after suspicion has focused 
upon him would greatly aid in protecting him from llis own 
folly and from IllS ignorance of the law. (See Memorandulll 
on the Detention of Arrested Persons and their Production 
Before a Committing Magistrate in Cllafre<.>, Documents on 
Fundamental Human Rights, Pamphlet 2 (1951-1952), p. 541.) 
It would also discourage police mistreatment of persons in 
ego, during the periotl in which the work of confession tnl!:esplace, can 
easily be recognized afterwards. The work of confession itself affords 
a partial gratification of tllQtmasochistie need for punishment. Only 
in this way-through the preceding 8uffering- docs it become under· 
standable thnt the criminal, with little nnxi('ly, a"'ait8 tile real punish. 
ment nfter the conf(>Rsion." (1 d. at p. 268.) 
"Questioning Buspe('ts has be(>n declare.1 ~ I jndi~Jl('n!!Rble iA Iftw enforc('· 
m('nt" (People v. Ha7l, 413 J1J. 6]:;, 624 (llO N.E.2d 249, 254], quoted 
in ClIlomllt V. Connecticut, 6 L.E<l.2t1 at I'. 1044). It is noteworthy that. 
ou retrial, "'llen his volnntary adll1is~ions W('Te ('xclmlNl from evid(>nce, 
})j Biasi was acquitted. (Sec New York World·Telegram and Sun, )[nreh 
2,1961,1).13 col. 1; 61 Coluill.I..Rev. ';'48 n. 32.) 
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\·nslody. 'fhe attorJleyt~ iUllction, hmn'wl', would hardly he 
('ollfill('J to preventing the third degrN' ana explaining to the 
Lt'l'U!;('d the legal siguifi('(iI1ce of the qUC'stiOllS posed. Rath('r, 
in tllC words of Mr .• Justi(!e Jackson, "To bring in a lawyer 
lU('fillS areal peril tosoll1tiol1 of the crime, because, ul)dcr 
unr adversary s~'stClll, he decms that llis sole duty is to pro-
1 ('I't IJis client-'-guil1.y or in11ocent-ano that in such a capacity 
he owes no duty whatever to help Rociety solV<' its ('rim(' In'ob-
lem. Under this conception oi criminal procedure, any lawyer 
worth bis fial~ will tell the suspect iu 110 uJJ('('rtain terms to 
mal,e no stat!'ment to police under any <;irl:um;;tallce~." 
l Watts v. II/diana, 338 U.S. at Pi 59 [dissenting opinion] ; 
Commonwcalth v. Agosto'lt, 364 Pa. 464 [72 A.2d 575, 583] ; 
l:::tatc v. Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 470 [73 A.2d 249] ; Williams, op. cit. 
supra at p. 344.) 
R.ecognition of a defendant's right toco118u1t with counsel 
nt the pretrial stages of the criminal action does not signify 
11,at counsel must be prC'scllt during interrogation. In Cali-
fornia, a defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel (Pen. 
Code, § 686, subel. 2). Moreover, "aiter .•• arrest, any at-
torney ••. may at the request of the prisoner or any relative 
of such prisoner, visit the person so arrested." (Pen. Coue, 
§ 825.) Willful prevention of consultation with an attorney 
makes an officer guilty of a misdt'meanor and liable in a ch'il 
lwtion for damages. (Ibid.) Before arraignment, an impe-
\~llnious defendant is cntitled to appointment of assigned 
(·ounsel or of a public defender. (P('n. Code, §987; Go,'. Code, 
§§ 27700-2i711.) Tb('se codc sl,ctions, <1l'signed to assure a 
defendant efi't'ctiw r~presl'ntation b:- COUlISC'l, do not preclude 
(l~lestioning him Whl'll Ilis coullsl'l is not prcs(;'1)t. 
The indigent dcf('ndant post's a!lother prublem under the Di 
Bia.si rule, particularly in jurisdictiol1s that are less libl'ral 
than California ill providing eoullsl'l at public expense. Giving 
un accused who has the llll'llllS nnll foresight to retain an at-
torney (fr('l}uently the "professional criminal") a right 10 
\'ounsel's pl'esC'llce dnrillg interrogntion, would widen the gulf 
hctween tllC rights of a ]wrSOIl with and one without counsel. 
(Pcople v. Di Bi.(l.si, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 552 [l6G N.E.2d 825] [dis-
I-wnting opinion] ; SPI' 36 N.Y.P.h R.'Y. 73i, 741-742.) A de-
fendant W]1O has obtaillC'd 111(' artyj(,(, of counsel would be 
less in neC'd of the protl'l'tion ofl'"rl'\l hy the Di B:'asi rule than 
";ould tbt' indigC'nt de~(']](l:1llt. To avoid this elL,crimination 
11t!' N!'w York courts 1\(>1<1 11lat an inrligC'llt d('f!'nllant must bc 
V'oyjdrtl \'()U11Sel befort' a pn,! -hill itt l1lC'ut intN'l'ogation can 
